An Empirical Analysis Of Debt-equity Choice In Indonesian Companies. by Santoso, Augustinus Setiawan"
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DEBT-EQUITY 
CHOICE IN INDONESIAN COMPANIES 
by: 
AUGUSTINUS SETIAWAN SANTOSO 
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2004 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to God for all Thy 
love, guidance, and blessings. Thy light has brought me hope and strength to 
overcome the hopelessness, loneliness, and disappointment. I may walk through 
valleys as dark as death, but I won't be afraid. You are with me, patiently, Your hand 
leads me along the right paths, and refreshes my life with new courage. Thy kindness 
and love have always been and will be with me each day of my life. 
This thesis presents the empirical results of my Ph.D. research at the School of 
Management of Universiti Sains Malaysia on debt-equity choice in Indonesian 
companies. It would have been impossible to conduct this research without the 
support, advice, help and sacrifices from and made by so many people. I am happy to 
extend my gratitude here. 
First, I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. 
Fauziah Md. Taib. She has encouraged my work through her support, interest, and 
constructive comments. She gave me freedom to explore possibilities, critical 
. feedback and practical suggestions for this thesis. Following her guidance I started to 
learn how to carry out a research. I really appreciate her commitment and tremendous 
guidance given to me. 
Second, I would like to thank Dato' Professor Dr. Daing Nasir Ibrahim, 
Professor Dr. Muhamad Jantan, Associate Professor Dr. Subramaniam S. PiIlay, Dr. 
Zamri Ahmad, Dr. Suhaimi Shahnon, Associate Professor Dr. Zainal Ariffin Ahmad, 
Associate Professor Dr. Yuserrie, and other lecturers of the School of Management 
for all their support and kind assistance during my study. 
In particular, I would like to thank Mr. Chee Hong Kok, a lecturer of the 
School of Management, and Dr. Anton Abdulbasah Kamil, a lecturer of the School of 
ii 
Mathematical Sciences - Universiti Sains Malaysia. Both of them gave me invaluable 
friendship and sacrificed their time to discuss relevant issues related to my study. 
Third, I wish to thank Dr. B. Herry Priyono - London School of Economics, 
Professor Dr. Hendrawan Supraktino, Dean of the Economics Faculty of Satya 
Wac ana Christian University and Professor Paul de Blots Ph.D., a lecturer of the 
Netherlands Business School - Nijenrode University for their encouragement, 
understanding, and support during my study. 
My appreciation and thanks also go to Mr. Isman Tjahyono for his supports, 
and also to Ms. Ristiyanti Prasetyo, a lecturer of Satya Wancana Christian University, 
Miss Vijaya Latshmi M. Suppiah, and Dr. Phua Lian Kee for their helps to edit my 
English and also Ir. Eddy Setyawan M.M. of STIE Widya Manggala . 
. 
I would also like to thank all my friends at the School of Management 
Universiti Sains Malaysia for their invaluable discussions, friendship and kind 
assistance. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Koesbintoro Singgih, Mr. 
Widiyanto, Dr. Lena Ellitan, Farida Sarkawi, Mr. Buyung Sarita, Dr. Jasman and Mr. 
Tafdil Husni. 
Last but by no means least, I want to express my sincere gratitude to my 
parents, who have always given me the freedom to pursue whatever I wanted to do 
and supported me in my decision. Finally, to Florentia Lily, my wife, for sharing her 
life with me, her love, all her patience and understanding throughout my study. M.1. 
Sallyvania and M.1. Nathania, our daughters, also contributed in their own ways, and 
have made my life more meaningful. 
Penang September, 2003 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Title Page 
Acknowledgement 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables 




1.1 Background of the Study 
1.1.1 Indonesian Financial Phenomenon 
1.1.2 Methodology Issues 
1.2 Research Questions 
1.3 Objective of the Study 
1.4 Contributions of the Study 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
CHAPTER 2 THE LEVEL OF DEBT, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, 
CONTROL AND MONITORING OF INDONESIAN COMPANIES 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Description of Debt-Equity Choice in Indonesian Companies 
2.2.1 Indonesian Companies Debt 
2.2.2 Financial Performance of Indonesian Companies 



















2.3.1 Ownership Structure on Indonesian Companies II 
2.3.2 Control and Monitoring ofIndonesian Companies 15 
2.4 The Legal Framework for Investor Protection in Indonesia 21 
2.4.1 Creditor's Rights 22 
2.4.2 Shareholder's Rights 25 
2.5 Discussion of the Link between the Level of Debt, Control and 28 
Monitoring of Indonesian Companies 
2.6 Summary of the Chapter 29 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 30 
3.2 Debt and Equity Choice 32 
3.2.1 Debt versus Equity 32" 
3.2.2 Capital Structure Models 33 
3.2.2.1 Overview of Trade-off theory 34 
3.2.2.2 Overview of Pecking Order Theory 35 
3.3 The Ownership Structure and Debt-Equity Choice in Agency Problem 36 
Framework 
3.3.1 Overview of The Ownership Structure 36 
3.3.1.1 External Block Ownership 37 
3.3.1.2 Managerial Block Ownership 38 
3.3.2 Overview of The Principal- Agency Problem 41 
3.3.2.1 Debtholders and Shareholders Conflicts 42 
3.3.2.2 Shareholders and Managers Conflicts 44 
3.4 Overview of Law and Finance 46 
v 
3.5 Relevance of the Theory to Indonesian Companies 47 
3.6 The Jointly Determination among Debt-Equity Choice, Ownership 49 
Structure, and Firm Performance 
3.7 The Determinant of Debt-Equity Choice 50 
3.8 Models and Hypotheses Development 58 
3.8.1 Model I: Debt-Equity Choice Equation 59 
3.8.1.1 Trade-off Theory and Pecking Order Theory 60 
3.8.1.2 The Link Between Debt-Equity Choice and Ownership 61 
Structure 
3.8.1.3 The Link Between Debt-Equity Choice and Agency 63 
Problem 
3.8.2 Model II: Ownership Structure Equation 65 
3.8.3 Model III: Firm Performance Equation 66 
3.9 Summary of the Chapter 67 
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 75 
4.2 Research Framework 75 
4.3 Sample Selection 77 
4.4 Variable Measurement 81 
4.5 Econometric Issues and Analysis 82 
4.5.1 Identification Test 82 
4.5.2 Descriptive Data 86 
4.5.3 Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity 87 
4.5.4 Residual Test of Two Stage Least Squares 88 
vi 
4.5.5 Wu-Hausman Test for Simultaneity 
4.6 Statistical Findings 
4.6.1 Diagnostic Test 
4.7 The Fit Model 
4.7.1 Coefficient of Determination (R -Squared) 
4.7.2 Adjusted R-Squared 
4.7.3 Wald Test - F Test 
4.8 Joint Coefficient Test 
4.9 Summary of the Chapter 
CHAPTER 5 DEBT-EQUITY CHOICE IN, INDONESIAN COMPANIES 
BEFORE AND DURING THE CRISIS 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Empirical Evidence of Debt-Equity Choice. 
5.3 Discussion of Debt-Equity Choice in Indonesian Companies 
5.4 Summary of the Chapter 

















6.2 Empirical Evidence of the Link between Debt-Equity Choice and 122 
Ownership Structure. 
6.4 Empirical Evidence of Shareholders and Debtholders Conflict. 124 
6.5 Discussion of Agency Problem in Indonesian Companies 128 
6.6 Summary of the Chapter 130 
vii 
CHAPTER 7 JOINT DETERMINATION AMONG THE LEVEL OF DEBT, 
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
7.1 Introduction 131 
7.2 The Link between Ownership Structure and the Level of Firm Debt 132 
7.3 The Link between Firm Performance and the Ownership Structure 133 
7.4 The Relation between Firm Performance and the Firm Debt and Firm 135 
Risk 
7.5 Discussion of the Link among Debt-Equity Choice, Ownership 137 
Structure and Firm Performance 
7.6 Summary of the Chapter 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Overall Conclusion 
8.2 Suggestion for the Future 
8.2.1 Suggestion on Methodology and Theory 
8.2.2 Suggestion on Implications 
















LIST OF TABLES 
Table No. Title of Table Page 
Table 1.1 Debt-Equity Ratio and Finn Perfonnance of Indonesian 2 
Companies, 1993 - 1997 (percent) 
Table 1.2 Ownership Concentration of Indonesian Companies, 1993- 3 
1997 (percent) 
Table 2.1 Financing Patterns of Indonesian Companies from 1993 to 2000 10 
(ratio) 
Table 2.2 Financing Perfonnance of Indonesian Companies from 1993 to 12 
2000 (percent) 
Table 2.3 Five Types of Control 16 
Table 2.4 Summary Type of Control of75 Indonesian Companies Before 17 
the Crisis (The Largest Shareholder) 
Table 2.5 Summary Type of Control of75 Indonesian Companies During 18 
the Crisis (The Largest Shareholder) 
Table 2.6 Summary of Ownership Composition from 1993 to 1996 20 
Table 2.7 Summary of Ownership Composition from 1997 to 2000 21 
Table 2.8 Summary of Evaluation of Processes for Debt Recovery 24 
Table 2.9 The Comparison of Ownership Concentration 'and Financial 29 
Leverage between Indonesia and Malaysia 
Table 3.1 Theories and Hypotheses which Relevant to Indonesian 48 
Condition in Debt-Equity Choice 
Table 3.2 Summary of Selected Previous Studies 69 
ix 
Table 3.3 A Review of the Use of Simultaneous Equations in Selected 73 
Previous Studies 
Table 4.1 Sample Data 78 
Table 4.2 Variable Measurement 81 
Table 4.3 Matrix Identification 83 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 86 
Table 4.5 Summary of Fit Model 93 
Table 4.6 Joint Coefficient Test of Debt-Equity Equation 95 
Table 4.7 Joint Coefficient Test of Ownership Structure Equation 96 
Table 4.8 Joint Coefficient Test of Firm Performance Equation 96 
Table 4.9 Summary of Statistical Findings of Debt-Equity Equation 97 
. 
Table 4.10 Summary of Statistical Findings of Ownership Structure 98 
Equation 
Table 4.11 Summary of Statistic Findings of Firm Performance Equation 99 
Table 4.12 Statistical Findings of Simultaneous Equation Regression 101 
(Largest Shareholder) 
Table 4.13 Statistical Findings of Simultaneous Equation Regression (Top 103 
Five Shareholders) 
Table 4.14 Statistical Findings of Simultaneous Equation Regression 105 
(Overall Period - Largest Shareholder) 
Table 4.15 Statistical Findings of Simultaneous Equation Regression 106 
(Overall Period - Top Five Shareholders) 
Table 5.1 Summary of Statistical Finding 114 
Table 6.1 The Mean of Tobin's Q and Debt Ratio ofIndonesian 126 
Companies 1993 - 2000 
x 
Table 6.2 Summary of Statistical Finding 129 
Table 7.1 Summary of Statistical Finding 139 
Table 7.2 The Organizational Structure and Ownership Structure of the 143 
Nursalim Group (1996) 
Appendix A Financial Analysis of Indonesian Companies 
Table A.I Financial Performance of Indonesian Companies by Sector 175 
1993 - 2000 Total Debt / Total Assets 
Table A.2 Financial Performance of Indonesian Companies by Sector 176 
1993 - 2000 Total Debt / Total Equity 
~ Table A.3 Financial Performance ofIndonesian Companies by Sector 177 
1993 - 2000 Tobin's Q 
Table AA Financial Performance of Indonesian Companies by Sector 178 
1993 - 2000 Return on Assets 
Table A.5 Ownership Structure of Indonesian Companies by Sector 1993 179 
-2000 
Managerial Block Ownership 
Table A.6 Ownership Structure oflndonesian Companies by Sector 1993 180 
- 2000. Shareholder - Largest Shareholder 
Table A.7 Ownership Structure oflndonesian Companies by Sector 1993 181 
- 2000. Ownership Concentration - Top Five Shareholders 
Table A.8 Ownership Composition ofIndonesian Companies by Sector 182 
1993 -1994 
Table A.9 Ownership Composition ofIndonesian Companies by Sector 183 
1995 -1996 
xi 
Table A.IO Ownership Composition of Indonesian Companies by Sector 184 
1997 - 1998 
Table A.I I Ownership Composition of Indonesian Companies by Sector 185 
1999 - 2000 
Table A.12 Indonesian Shareholder Rights 186 
Table A.13 Indonesian Creditor Rights 187 
Table A.14 Types of Control of 75 Indonesian Companies from 1993 to 188 
1996 
Table A.15 Types of Control of 75 Indonesian Companies from 1997 to 191 
2000 
Appendix B Statistical Analysis 
Table B.l Test of Differences 195 
Table B.2 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity (Before 196 
the Crisis - Largest Shareholder) 
Table B.3 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity (Before 198 
the Crisis - Top Five Shareholders) 
Table B.4 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity (During 200 
the Crisis - Largest Shareholder) 
Table B.5 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Endoge'neity (During 202 
the Crisis - Top Five Shareholders) 
Table B.6 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity (Overall 204 
Period - Largest Shareholder) 
Table B.7 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity (Overall 206 
Period - Top Five Shareholders) 
xii 
Table B.8 Correlation Matrix of 2SLS Residual. Largest Shareholder - 208 
Before the Crisis. 
Table B.9 Correlation Matrix of 2SLS Residual. Top Five Shareholders - 208 
Before the Crisis. 
Table B.10 Correlation Matrix of2SLS Residual. Largest Shareholder- 209 
During the Crisis. 
Table B.11 Correlation Matrix of 2SLS Residual. Five Shareholders - 209 
During the Crisis. 
Table B.12 Correlation Matrix of2SLS Residual. Largest Shareholder- 210 
Overall Period 
Table B.13 Correlation Matrix of2SLS Resid~al. Top Five Shareholders - 210 
Overall Period 
Table B.14 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Simultaneity (Before 211 
the Crisis~ Largest Shareholder) 
Table B.15 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Simultaneity (Before 213 
the Crisis - Top Five Shareholders) 
Table B.16 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Simultaneity (During 215 
the Crisis - Largest Shareholder) 
Table B.17 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Simultaneity (During 217 
the Crisis - Top Five Shareholders) 
Table B.18 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Simultaneity (Overall 219 
Period - Largest Shareholder) 
Table B.19 The Wu-Hausman Specification Test for Simultaneity (Overall 221 
Period - Top Five Shareholders) 
xiii 
Table B.20 Three Stage Least Squares Findings - Before the Crisis - 223 
Largest Shareholder 
Table B.21 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Findings - Before the Crisis - 225 
Largest Shareholder 
Table B.22 Three Stage Least Squares Findings - Before the Crisis - Top 227 
Five Shareholders 
Table B.23 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Findings - Before the Crisis- 229 
Top Five Shareholders 
Table B.24 Three Stage Least Squares Findings - During the Crisis - 231 
Largest Shareholder 
Table B.25 Three Stage Least Squares Findings - During the Crisis - Top 233 
Five Shareholders 
Table B.26 Three Stage Least Squares Findings'- the Overall Period - 235 
Largest Shareholder 
Table B.27 Three Stage Least Squares Findings - the Overall Period - Top 237 
Five Shareholders 
Table B.28 Normality Test 239 
Table B.29 Correlation Matrix 240 
xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure No Title of Figure Page 
Figure 2.1 Ownership concentration of Indonesian companies before and 15 
during the crisis 
Figure 3.1 Debt versus equity 32 
Figure 3.2 Summary of the joint determination between debt-equity choice, 49 
ownership structure, and firm performance 
Figure 3.3 The link between the level of debt and Tobin's Q as a proxy of 53 
growth opportunity 
Figure 3.4 The link between the level of debt and profitability 57 
Figure 3.5 The link between firm debt and managerial block ownership 62 
Figure 4.1 Research road map 84 
Figure 5.l The Link between the level of debt and profitability during the 112 
crisis 
Figure 6.1 The relationship between firm debt and Tobin's Q before the 127 
crisis 
Figure 7.1 The link between Tobin's Q and earning volatility during the 137 
crisis 
Figure 7.2 The Ownership Structure of the Nursalim Group in Indonesia 141 
Figure 7.3A The Link Between Soeharto Family and Their Business 147 
Figure 7.3B The Link Between Soeharto Family and Their Business 148 
xv 
Abstract 
This study offers new insights by employing Indonesian data. The uniqueness of 
Indonesian companies is reflected by the common occurrence of ownership 
concentration among a few large families and affiliation with a corporate group in 
which seems nonexistent in many developed countries. With regard to the 
methodology problem, this study uses simultaneous equations model to overcome the 
endogeneity problem in debt-equity study. It is reported that the external block 
ownership has dominant position by having majority control and impact on powerless 
Indonesian managers. The inadequate legal framework for investors' protection, 
insufficient internal financing and improper development of the capital market occur. 
With regard to this situation, debt-equity chQice was widely practiced. There is 
evidence that Indonesian companies relied heavily on loans to finance unrealistic 
rapid corporate expansion. The insignificant relationship between the level of debt 
and tangibility of assets and profitability indicate the appearance of moral hazard 
problem before the crisis. This study points out that the dominant external block 
ownership can have a detrimental effect on the shareholders and debtholders relation. 
It induces the higher cost of debt which is typically described in forms of asset 
substitution or risk shifting problem. As a result, severe agency conflict occurs is not 
between shareholders and managers as often assumed in the previous studies but 
between shareholders and debtholders. 
xvi 
Analisis Empirikal Tentang Piliban Hutang-Ekuiti Bagi Syarikat-Syarikat di 
Indonesia 
Abstrak 
Kajian ini menyumbangkan pengetahuan yang baru dengan menggunakan data dari 
Indonesia. Khususnya, pilihan di antara hutang dan ekuiti oleh firma Indonesia 
berbeza daripada negara maju. Ini terbukti di dalam konsentrasi pemilikan di antara 
beberapa keluarga terpengaruh dan perhubungan di an tara sesuatu kumpulan syarikat 
yang tidak berlaku di negara maju. Berhubung dengan masalah metodologi, kajian ini 
menggunakan model persamaan serentak untuk mengatasi masalah endogeneiti yang 
timbul di dalam setengah kajian ke atas hutang-ekuiti yang lepas. Ia dilaporkan 
bahawa pemilikan luaran secara blok mempunyai kedudukan yang dominan secara 
. 
kawalan majority dan ini mempengaruhi pengurus Indonesia supaya menjadi tidak 
berwibawa. Undang-undang yang tidak lengkap bagi mempertahankan hak pelabur, 
kekurangan kewangan dalaman dan pasaran saham yang mentah juga berlaku. 
Berhubung dengan keadaan ini, pilihan hutang-ekuiti diamalkan. Terdapat bukti 
bahawa syarikat di Indonesia bergantung kuat ke atas pinjaman untuk membiayai 
perkembangan corporate pesat dan tidak realistik. Perhubungan yang tidak signifikan 
di antara tahap hutang dan ketaraan aset dan pendapatan membuktikan kemunculan 
masalah "moral hazard'. Kajian ini membuktikan bahawa pemilikan luaran secara 
blok boleh mempunyai kesan negative ke atas perhubungan' di antara pemegang 
saham dan pemberi hutang. Ia mengakibatkan kos hutang yang lebih tinggi yang 
sering disebutkan di dalam bentuk masalah penggantian asset atau pemindahan risiko. 
Oleh sebab ini, masalah agensi yang serius di Indonesia berlaku bukan di an tara 
pemegang saham dan pengurus seperti yang diandaikan di negara yang rnaju tetapi di 




1.1 Background of the Study 
Debt-equity choice is one of the most important decisions in financing policy. The 
impact of a faulty financing decision on a company could be disastrous as was 
experienced by many South East Asian companies in the 1997 financial crisis. Many 
companies were on the verge of collapsing when the economy changed overnight 
during the crisis (Kim & Mark, 1999). There is an interesting financial phenomenon 
in Indonesian companies with respect to debt-equity choice as reflected by the high 
level of debt and high ownership concentration. 
A number of previous studies on debt-equity. choice have assumed firm debt as 
an endogenous variable which in turn is determined by several exogenous variables 
(e.g. Homaifar, Zietz, & Benkato, 1994; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 
1988). A majority of empirical studies employ a model in which the level of debt is 
regressed on a list of explanatory variables by assuming that Fd = !(Xi), where: Fd is 
a measurement of firm debt, and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables (Prasad, 
Green, & Murinde, 2001). 
Prior studies also argued that ownership structure is a function of the level of 
debt and other firm's variables. These two variables, namely the level of debt, firm 
performance and the ownership structure were used interchangeably as a dependent 
and an independent variable (Setiawan & Taib, 2002b). This is known as endogeneity 
problem or jointly determined problem under the econometric point of view (Greene, 
2000; Gujarati, 2003). 
Studies on capital structure have made great contributions in understanding the 
behaviour of firms with respect to their choice among the use of debt or equity. 
Despite the merits, debt-equity study should be understood critically on the real issues 
in developing countries namely Indonesian companies which are suffering from high 
level of debt and ownership concentration. It should also address to the relevant 
econometric viewpoint such as endogeneity problem. 
1.1.1 Financial Phenomenon of Indonesian Companies 
Most Indonesian public listed companies (henceforth Indonesian companies) have 
been substantially financed by credit. As shown in Table 1.1, the debt-equity ratio 
increased from 240.0 in 1993 to 310.0 in 1997 (Husnan, 2001). It indicates that the 
higher debt correlate with the lower return on assets. Similar findings were reported in 
other studies by Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (2000a), Zhuang, Edwards, Webb, 
and Capulong (2000). 
Table 1.1 
Debt to Equity and Firm Performance of Indonesian Companies, 1993 - 1997 
(percent) 
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Debt-to-Equity 240.0 220.0 220.0 230.0 310.0 
Return on Equity 12.5 12.0 11.3 10.7 1.1 
Return on Assets 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.2 0.6 
Source: Husnan (2001). 
Concerning ownership structure, empirical evidence show that Indonesian 
companies are characterised by high ownership concentration as reflected by Table 
1.2. Other studies which employed Indonesian data also reported similar finding 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 1999a; La Porta, Silanes & Shleifer, 1998a; Taridi, 
1999; Zhuang et aI., 2000). High ownership concentration has been regarded as one of 
2 
the factors that lead to excessive borrowing behaviour. This In tum can affect 
companies' performance negatively (Supratikno, 2000). 
A few previous studies of Indonesian companies for examples, Husnan (2001) 
and Taridi (1999) have investigated corporate governance issues in Indonesia. These 
studies indicate that Indonesian companies were suffering from high level of debt and 
ownership concentration. However, the possibilities of the existence of moral hazard 
problem in debt-equity choice were not examined in tliese studies. Furthermore, prior 
studies only provided descriptive explanation with respect to the association between 
ownership structure and moral hazard problems (Kwik, 1994, 1996; Wibisono, 1998). 
Table 1.2 
Ownership Concentration of Indonesian Companies, 1993 - 1997 (percent) 
Shareholder Rank 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average 
Largest 50.5 48.1 47.9 48.5 48.2 48.6 
Second Largest 16.6 13.7 14.1 12.0 11.6 13.6 
Third Largest 3.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.9 
Fourth Largest 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 
Fifth Largest 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.8 
Total 72.7 68.3 68.7 67.5 67.5 68.9 
Source: Husnan (2001). 
These financial phenomenons can be explained using agency theory due to the 
problem may originate from the powerless managers in determining debt and equity 
to finance the investment. Regarding risk aversion assumption (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), when ownership concentration gets bigger, it is possible that moral hazard 
behaviour occurs with shareholders shifting their risks to debtholders. 
It is widely accepted that debt-equity choice is related to ownership structure 
(Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 1999; Chen & Steiner, 1999; Cho, 1998; Xu & Wang, 
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1997). To date, there has been no study looking at the relationship between debt-
equity choice and ownership structure, and how it affects the moral hazard problem of 
Indonesian companies. Therefore, this study is going to investigate the 
interdependency among debt-equity choice, ownership structure and firm 
performance. Apart from highlighting how Indonesian companies choose debt or 
equity in financing their investment, it also intends to provide further enlightenment 
in relation to financial behaviour, namely moral hazard problem. 
1.1.2 Methodology Issues 
Generally, debt-equity study is associated with three constructs i.e. the level of firm 
debt itself, ownership structure, and firm performance. However, previous studies 
basically take the relationships among these constructs in isolation. Jensen and Smith 
(1985), and Jensen and Warner (1988) conducted prior work that paid attention to the 
links between ownership structure and control. 
A study which discussed the link between corporate strategy and capital 
structure is conducted by Barton and Gordon (1988). Prasad, Bruton and Merikas 
(1997) examined long-run strategic capital structure and argued that if capital 
structure can be identified, a firm could maximize its value by reaching and 
maintaining its financial mix. Meanwhile, Kochhar (1997) studied the relationship 
among strategic assets, capital structure, and firm performance. 
Brailsford et al. (1999) focused on the link between ownership structure and 
debt-equity choice. Ang, Rebel and James (2000), de Jong (1999, 2000) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) conducted the study which concentrated on the relationship 
between debt-equity choice and the agency problem. 
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There are several notable studies on the determinant of debt-equity choice 
such as Banerjee, Hesmati, and Wihlborg (1999); Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), 
Homaifar et al. (1994) and Kester (1986). Studies on the link between investor 
protection, ownership concentration and the level of debt were conducted by La Porta, 
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998a). 
Generally, previous studies used a straightforward regression in analyzing 
determinants of debt-equity choice. Firm debt is normally assumed to be a dependent 
variable in most studies, some examples of studies are those of Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987); Brailsford et al. (1999); Friend and Lang (1988); Kim and 
Sorensen (1986); McConnell and Servaes (1995); Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1998); 
Rajan and Zinga\es (1995); Titman and Wessels (1988). 
A few studies have argued that ownership structure is a function of the level of 
debt and other firm's variables (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morek, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988). In other words, the level of firm debt has been used interchangeably 
either as a dependent or an independent variable in previous studies. 
Hence, there is a good reason to believe that if the level of firm debt, the 
ownership structure, as well as the firm performance have been jointly determined, it 
is necessary to look at these variables simultaneously. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Indonesia is a developing country with high use of debt and is among the highest 
ownership concentration in the world (Zhuang et aI, 2000). It is interesting to see how 
these uniques feature of Indonesian market influence the companies' choice of debt 
and equity: 
1. How do Indonesian companies finance their investment? 
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2. Which block of ownership has prominent role in debt-equity choice? What agency 
problem might occur in relation to the role of the dominant block in debt-equity? 
3. What is the nature of the link between ownership structure and control related to 
debt-equity choice? 
4 How do ownership structure and the level of firm debt have an impact on firm 
performance? 
1.3 Objective of the Study 
This study tries to examine the Indonesian financial phenomenon particularly 
In debt-equity choice such as: (i) whether the debt-equity choice is related to 
ownership structure. The ownership of the Indonesian companies was concentrated 
among a few large families as opposed to companies in developed countries where 
ownership structure is more dispersed; (ii) whether the affiliation with a corporate 
group has impact to debt-equity choice. The affiliation with a corporate group which 
widely practised in Indonesian companies, as for this phenomenon does not existing 
in many developed countries (see also Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000c). 
1.4 Contributions of the Study 
Building on well-known capital structure theories and principal agency model, this 
study attempts to provide some contributions to this field by comparing the findings 
before, during the crisis, and in the overall period. It also provides new insights by 
paying attention to the curvilinear relationship among firm debt, ownership structure, 
and firm performance in an integrated link. 
The application of agency theory will give clear explanations about moral 
hazard problem which might occur related to how firms in Indonesia prefer debt or 
6 
equity to finance their investment. Specifically, these contributions are taken in the 
form of: 
1. Documenting descriptively financial pattern, ownership concentration and 
ownership composition of Indonesian companies, and examine it by 
presenting the type of control and monitoring of Indonesian companies. With 
regard to ownership concentration, this study has two proxies, namely the 
largest external block ownership shareholder (henceforth the largest 
shareholder) and the top five external block ownership shareholders 
(henceforth top five shareholders). 
2. It offers new evidence of moral hazard behaviour when there are sufficient 
condition for the problem to occur for instance, high ownership concentration 
and insufficient legal framework for investors' protection. It contributs in the 
following ways: 
2.1. Examining the debt-equity choice of Indonesian companies before and 
during the crisis. 
2.2. This study would seek answer as to why Indonesian companies prefer 
debt to equity. 
2.3. This study re-examines debt-equity choice where high ownership 
concentration occurred. 
2.4. This study re-examines the agency problem encountered by Indonesian 
companies. 
3. Contributing methodologically by using simultaneous mUltiple equations. 
Besides having its advantages, it offers a series of tests provide method which 
has adequate result. 
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